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Abstract 
 
 
During the 2007-2009 crises financial institutions have come under increasing pressure 
from regulators, politicians and shareholders to change their compensation practices in 
order to remove the incentive for short term excessive risk taking.  
 In this paper we analyze first how the common executive compensation, which 
is composed of equity-based compensation (stocks and executive stock options) and a 
fixed cash compensation, leads to a concave relationship between assets risk and 
compensation value and creates an incentive for the executive to choose corner solutions 
that either lead to an excessive risk taking or to a freeze out of the lending activity to the 
public.  
 This paper’s main contribution is a novel component, for executive 
compensation, that is paid only if the value of the firm assets is located in some 
predetermined range. This new form of compensation motivates the executive to take an 
intermediate (internal solution) level of assets risk because of the convex relationship 
between assets risk and compensation value.  
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1. Introduction 
Financial intermediaries, particular commercial banks, are special because of their 
economic functions, which include: asset transformation, delegated monitoring and the 
provision of liquidity. An essential part of banking involves risk taking, this is beneficial 
to the economy up to a point of “excessive risk” taking that can be detrimental. Major 
developments in capital markets in recent years, such as globalization, consolidation and 
financial innovation, have increased uncertainty in financial markets and therefore risk 
taking and its management have became a major concern for financial institutions. 
Examples are the Basel accords which concentrate on banking risks (mainly credit) and 
capital adequacy of banks 1  
 The 2007-2009 financial crisis was caused by a number of factors one of them 
being excessive risk taking by financial institutions. This excessive risk taking took on 
different forms, including: origination of subprime ARMs structured to systematically 
default or be refinanced; holding on excessively large amounts of ABS; increased 
leverage ratios (off-balance) and writing huge volumes of out-of-the-money put options 
(CDS). These actions contributed to a credit boom and housing bubble that burst in 2007. 
Risk taking was exacerbated by institutions that were subject to moral hazard because of 
government explicit (deposit insurance) or implicit (to-big-to-fail) guarantees 
This increased motivation for risk taking by financial institutions can be explained 
by the rapid growth of executive equity based compensation in recent years. Between 
1993 and 2003, equity-based compensation has increased considerably, but this growth 
was not accompanied by a substitution effect, that is a reduction in non-equity 
compensation (Gabaix and Landier 2008, Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005). There is also 
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evidence for that option grants closely track stock market indices while CEO cash 
compensation is weakly correlated with the Dow-Jones Average, so that CEO total 
compensation is strongly correlated with the stock market (Hall and Murphy 2003). 
According to agency theory, equity based compensation (stocks or stock options) is 
positively related to the underlying stock variance and therefore motivates executives to 
take higher levels of risk, which would be more acceptable to shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976 and Hirshleifer and Suh 1992). Empirical studies have provided support 
to the agency theory hypothesis (Agrawal and Mandelker 1987, DeFusco et al. 1990, 
Guay 1999 and Coles et al. 2008). Moreover, there is evidence that following 
deregulation, banks have increasingly employed stock option-based compensation and as 
a result the structure of executive compensation induced more risk-taking (Chen et al 
2006). 2 
At the initial stage of the 2007-2009 financial crises financial institution came 
indeed under increasing pressure from regulators, politicians and shareholders to change 
their executive pay structure to remove the incentive for short term excessive risk taking. 
Congress imposed restrictions on pay arrangements on all financial firms that receive 
funds from the federal government's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). However at 
the later stages of the crisis the opposite problem happened:  A “flight to quality” took 
place and financial institutions tightened lending standards, which resulted in a credit 
crunch for businesses and households. The U.S government (U.S. Treasury and Federal 
Reserve) engaged in large unprecedented efforts to unfreeze the credit markets and renew 
the flow of bank loans to the public.3 However, the Treasury has been criticized by many 
for not having given clear guidance regarding the type of the optimal new executive 
 5
compensation.4  Moreover, critics claimed that although hundreds of billions of dollars 
were injected into the marketplace there has been no demonstrable effect on lending to 
households and businesses. 5  
This paper employs an option approach to show that a compensation scheme that 
includes options and cash to be paid if the firm remains solvent, will lead to corner 
solutions by the manager, who will choose either the lowest or the highest possible level 
of risk, depending on the value of the assets (which are assumed to depend on the state of 
the economy: whether in a boom or a recession). We show that a compensation package 
that combines equity based compensation and risky cash would not incentivize the 
executives to take a moderate level of risk because of the concave relationship between 
assets volatility and the value of total compensation. The current freeze in the credit 
market can be explained by the negative incentive of executives to increase assets risk. 
This negative incentive for risk taking is the result of the decline in the value of the assets 
of financial institutions which cause the cash compensation to dominate the equity-based 
compensation.  We show that in such a state the value of the executive compensation 
decreases with the level of assets risk. Therefore the executive is motivated to choose the 
minimum possible level of assets risk. The expected result is that executives of financial 
institution would not substitute the relative low risk of say government debt with risky 
loans to businesses and households.  
This paper’s main contribution is a proposed new compensation component in the 
executive compensation structure. Unlike existing compensations forms this one 
motivates the executive to take a moderate level of assets risk and thus enhancing 
financial stability by discouraging financial institutions from taking excessive risks 
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during  boom times while avoiding the negative incentive for risk taking by the financial 
institutions and speeding up financial recovery in a crisis. 6 
The suggested executive compensation includes, as in the traditional executive 
compensation package, a fixed payment that is paid as long as the company is solvent, an 
option-based compensation that increases with the value of assets and a new 
compensation in the form of a fixed payment, that is paid upon maturity if the value of 
the firm assets is between two upper thresholds..  
 The new component of the executive compensation has a payoff identical to that 
of a combination of a long “cash-or nothing” call option (i.e., binary option) that pays 
fixed amount of money at maturity if the value of assets is above some upper threshold, 
and a short position in a similar option with a higher strike price. The compensation value 
is bell-shaped with respect to assets volatility. Therefore, because of the convex 
relationship between the total value of the two options and volatility their maximum 
would be reached at some interior level of volatility and not as a corner solution of zero 
or infinity.   
The model presented is related to papers that try to find ways to reduce the risk 
taking incentives of stockholders and executives. These measures include bond covenants 
(Smith and Warner 1979), shorting debt maturity (Barnea et al 1980, Barclay and Smith 
1995 and Guedes and Opler 1996), bank borrowing (Diamond 1989, 1991) .Our paper is 
also related to works that analyze corporate securities that can reduce assets substitution 
and therefore deter executives from taking excessive risks (Green 1984 and Chesney and 
Gibson-Asner 2001).  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
model for the valuation of executive compensation under a traditional compensation 
structure. Section 3 analyzes executive compensation and incentives in good times (the 
bubble of 2004-2007) and then analyzes executive compensation and incentives in bad 
times (the crises of 2007-2009). Section 4 presents the new suggested executive 
compensation component and analyzes its sensitivity to assets risk.  Section 5 concludes 
the paper with a summary.  
 
2. The analysis of executive compensation and its risk taking 
incentives 
In this paper’s valuation process of the financial institutions’ securities is followed 
through an option-based structural model of credit as developed by Merton's (1974). 
Specifically we consider a hypothetical financial institution with assets that are 
continuously traded in an arbitrage free and complete market with riskless borrowing and 
lending at a constant rate r . The value of the bank’s assets, denoted byV , is independent 
of its capital structure, and is well described under the risk neutral probability by the 
following stochastic differential equation: 
 
 
                                                 VdWVdtrdV σδ +−= )(                                              (1) 
 
 
where W is a standard Brownian motion, δ is the institution’s payout ratio and σ is the 
instantaneous constant standard deviation of the assets’ rate of return.7  
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We assume that initially the financial institution is financed by two types of 
securities. The first is a single zero-coupon deposit with a face value of DF  that is held 
by a depositor. The deposit is the most senior security, and thus has priority over all other 
classes of securities. The second security is a residual equity claim with a market value 
denoted by S . It is next assumed that the bank encounters some financial distress due to 
poor performing assets. The government “bails out” the institution by purchasing some 
troubled assets in return for preferred stock. This junior debt/ preferred stock has a face 
value of PF  and it is subordinated to the senior deposit in the event of bankruptcy.   
We assume that during the time horizon tT − , between the current time and debt 
maturity, the firm does not depart from its ex ante investment policy and thus the 
executive’s choice of volatility is made at the beginning of the period (at time 0) with the 
main objective of maximizing the value of her compensation. This objective does not 
necessarily coincide with the firm value maximization or with the stockholders’ value 
maximization. The executive compensation has two elements. The first is a fixed 
payment, which is paid as long as the firm is solvent. The second element is a variable 
component made up of executive stock options that depend on the performance of the 
financial institution as measured by its common stock prices or some other profit 
measures.8 
The fixed payoff, in the form of salary and other benefits is defined in our 
framework as a fixed amount of money, CF  which is paid if the value of the firm’s assets 
exceeds the value of its liabilities at their maturity. It is assumed that the equity-based 
compensation, as is common, is not fungible and that the executive must hold these 
securities till maturity (as in Ross 2004). The equity based compensation in our model is 
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in the form of stock options. However, since the expiry date of the options are assumed to 
identical to the maturity date of the entire firm’s liabilities their value is similar to 
compensation in the form of common stocks.  
To calculate the fair value of the stock option, one needs to find the firm’s value 
at which the holder of such an option is indifferent between exercising and not exercising 
the option. This problem was solved by Geske (1979) who used the Fourier transforms 
method. However, when the expiration date of the option and the stock are equal, as in 
our model, the Black and Scholes (1973) formula becomes a special case of the 
compound option formula and the strike price of this option is the sum of the face values 
of the claims with higher seniority and the striking price of the option, defined as H . 
Therefore by assuming that the executive compensation has the same maturity as the 
other liabilities, at timeT , its payoff is equal to β  units of the maximum between zero 
and the difference between the financial institution’s assets value and the sum of the face 
values of the deposits, the promised payment to the subordinated debt/ preferred stock 
holders and the predetermined strike price of the executive stock options.9 The payoff at 
expiry of the executive compensation, defined by TE , can therefore be written as: 
 
                    { }PDT FFVCPDTT FHFFVE +>+−−−= 1)0,max(β                                       (2) 
 
where 10 ≤≤ β  is the number of common stocks that the executive can receive by 
exercising her options and ψ1 is the indicator function of the eventψ . The current value 
of this position can be replicated by using two options: the first is a regular call option 
with a strike price of HFF PD ++  and the second is a cash-or-nothing call option, that 
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pays a fixed amount of money at maturity if the value of the firm’s assets is above the 
face value of the senior deposit and the commitment to the preferred stockholders. The 
intuition behind this term is that if the institution becomes insolvent the government 
deposit insurance fund or the debtholders will layoff the executive officer who would 
lose her fixed compensation.  
The value of the executive’s compensation and its sensitivity to various 
parameters can now be determined using standard option pricing theory. The current 
value of the executive’s position can be written as: 
 
         ),,(),,( VFFTBinaryCallFVHFFTCallE PDCPD ++++= β                      (3) 
 
The general pricing equations for the call option and the binary call option can be 
expressed under the standard assumptions for risk-neutral contingent-claim valuation as: 
 
)])(()(([),,( TKdKNKdVNeVKTCall rT σ−−= −  
))((),,( TKdNeVKTBinaryCall rT σ−= −  
 
 
where N ( ) is the cumulative normal density and the function d (K) is defined as: 
 
T
TrKVKd σ
σ )2/()/ln()(
2++=  
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By combining the values of the two options and the value of the traditional executive 
compensation, the fixed payments and equity based compensation, can be expressed as: 
 
))(()(       
)])(()())(([
TFFdNeFFF
THFFdNeHFFHFFdVNE
PDrTPDC
PDrTPDPD
σ
σβ
−+++
−++++−++=
−
−
   
                                                     (4) 
 
When pF  is equal to zero, the pricing equation becomes a special case where there are 
no government or privately owned preferred stocks. 
The most interesting parameter of the model is risk, which enters the option 
pricing formula in the form of volatility. If the executive can decide what would be the 
riskiness of the firms assets she would choose the volatility level that maximizes the 
value of her compensation. The impact of a change in volatility on the value of the 
executive’s compensation can now be found by taking the derivative of E w.r.t. σ: 
                    
σσ
βσ
/))(('e)(          
)(('
rT- PDPDC
PD
FFdTNFFdF
THFFdVNE
+−+
−++=∂
∂
                              (5) 
 
where π2/)( 2/2' xeXN −=  . While the sensitivity of the option based compensation to 
assets risk is always positive (the first expression on the R.H.S of the equation) the cash-
or-nothing call option sensitivity to assets risk is always negative if the option is in the 
money since default has not occurred. Therefore, the executive’s risk incentive is an 
increasing function of the value of the option-based compensation and a decreasing 
function of the value of the fixed cash benefit.  To analyze optimal risk taking by 
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executives we consider in the next section two states of the world: “good times” when the 
value of the assets of the financial firm far exceeds the value of its liabilities and “bad 
times”.  
 
 
 3. Analyzing executive compensation and incentives in good and bad 
times 
In these two states of nature the relative values of the two compensation components 
changes and as a result so does the executive’s risk taking behavior. 
 
3.1 Executive compensation and incentives in good times (2004-2007 bubble) 
We assume that the executives’ objectives do not necessarily coincide with firm value 
maximization when the financial institution is leveraged (See Chesney and Gibson-Asner 
2001 and Sundaram and Yermack 2008) and their main objective is to maximize the 
value of their claims. Henceforth, the executives would choose an optimal volatility for 
the firms’ assets that maximize the value of their compensation. 
In good times the value of the assets of the financial institution is assumed to be 
far above the value of its liabilities. We can therefore set: )( PD FFV += γ  where 1≥γ  
is the inverse of the leverage ratio. Since the stockholders have a call option on the value 
of the firm’s assets the value of their holdings would increase with assets volatility See 
Jensen and Meckling 1976 and Galai and Masulis 1976). However, the executives’ 
incentive may differ from stockholders motivation due to their fixed compensation and 
therefore stockholders have a strong incentive to mitigate the negative risk taking 
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motivation that is created by the executive’s fixed compensation by increasing the 
amount of equity based component hold by the executives. This wealth transfer effect 
exists mostly in the context of the banking industry since depositors (and deposit 
insurance funds) cannot perfectly monitor the actions of stockholders (Saunders et al. 
1990) 
 Figures 1 presents the value of the executive compensation, when the ratio 
between the amounts of fixed compensation (the parameter CF ) and the units of option 
based compensation (the parameter β) is relatively high and equal to 2.5, for different 
levels of assets volatility and leverage. In this example, the volatility levels can vary 
between 5% and 35%, time to maturity is set at one year and the risk free rate is 5%. The 
executive stock compensation is in the form of a simple call option with a strike price of 
0.25, which means that the option can be exercised above the current value of assets 
when 35.1=γ . Figure 1 shows that under any level of volatility, if the firm remains 
solvent, the value of the executive compensation is a decreasing function of assets 
volatility. Therefore, the executive has a strong incentive to reduce assets volatility as 
much as possible.  
 The stockholders effort to align the executive payoff with their risk profile would 
end up in an increasing ratio of equity based compensation to fixed compensation. Figure 
2 presents the value of the executive compensation when the ratio between the amounts 
of fixed compensation and the units of option based compensation is relatively low and 
equal to 0.4. When assets values are relatively high and the parameter γ  is above 1.21 
the value of the executive compensation increases with the level of assets volatility. 
Therefore, under such conditions executives in financial institutions have strong 
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motivation to implement actions that would increase assets risk. The phenomenon, of 
increased equity based compensation accompanied by increased level of assets risk was 
observed in the US between 2004 and 2007 (See Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005). Major 
investments firms and commercial banks invested in subprime mortgages and other risky 
assets as CDOs and CDSs which where relatively new instruments. 
 
3.2 Executive compensation and incentives in bad times (2007-2009 financial crisis) 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis was characterized by a sharp decrease in the value of the 
assets of the financial sector’s assets and consequently a sharp decline in the share prices 
of many financial institutions. Some of these institutions were forced to sell themselves, 
some went into bankruptcy and others were bailed out by the U.S. government. The crisis 
first caused to a credit crunch and then to a credit freeze when financial institutions 
stopped lending even to each other. To unlock the credit markets the U.S. Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve injected huge sums of money into the system and also guaranteed a 
large part of the credit market. Implicit in these government efforts was the assumption 
that the credit crisis is mainly a result of an insufficient supply of funds. Despite these 
massive government efforts financial institutions have not resumed lending and increased 
their holdings of riskless assets.10 As can be seen in Figure 2, the fall in assets value (low 
level of γ) due to the crisis resulted in the executives having a negative incentive to take 
risks since the value of their compensation is maximized under low assets risk. This can 
explain why the various plans of the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve of supplying 
liquidity to financial institutions have been ineffective in thawing the freeze in the credit 
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markets. Executives had little motivation to substitute the relatively low risk government 
debt with risky credit to businesses and households. 
The fact that under any level of leverage the executive optimal decision would be 
to choose between two extreme solutions is shown in Figure 3, where the value of the 
executive compensations versus assets risk is presented for different levels of leverage. 
For high levels of γ the executive would choose the highest possible level of risk and for 
low γ levels the executive would choose lower levels of risk. 
Figure 4 presents the total value of the executive compensation as well as the 
value of the fixed and equity based compensation for different levels of assets volatility. 
Figure 4 highlights the fact that the executive payoff function is a concave function of 
assets risk and therefore the executives would choose either a high level of risk which 
increases the risk of default of the financial institution and can cause systemic risk for the 
economy, or avoid taking any risk at all, a solution that can cause a severe liquidity crisis 
for the real sector of the economy. Moreover, the restrictions on option pay under TARP 
where financial institutions are not allowed to deduct for tax purposes senior executive 
compensation in excess of $500,000 for each senior executive would make the problem 
even worse. Such restrictions would further reduce the quantity of equity based 
compensation and thereby give a stronger incentive to the executive to avoid risk.  
 
4. New terms for executive compensation  
This section presents a new structure for executive compensation that counters to the 
existing compensation scheme, motivates the executive to take moderate levels of assets 
risk and therefore enhances financial stability. It may help avoid future crises and speed 
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up financial recovery by eliminating the incentive for corner solutions for risk taking by 
the executives of financial institutions.  
The proposed executive compensation scheme includes, as before a cash (fixed) 
payment that is paid as long as the company is solvent, an option-based compensation 
and a new type of compensation in the form of a fixed payment, MF . This amount is paid 
at maturity if the value of the firm’s assets is between two thresholds, denoted LH and 
HH respectively, which are located above the current value of the firm’s assets. If 
however, at expiry the value of the firm’s assets is outside of this range the executive’s 
payoff is zero. 
 The newly suggested component of the executive compensation has an identical 
payoff as that of a combination of a long binary call option that pays a fixed amount of 
money at maturity if the value of assets is above some threshold, defined as VH L ≥ , and 
a short position at a similar option with a higher strike price VHH LH ≥≥ . The value of 
this compensation is bell-shaped with respect to assets volatility. Therefore, due to the 
convex relationship between the total value of the two options and volatility, their 
maximum would be reached at some moderate level of volatility and not in one of the 
corner solutions of zero or infinity. Under the suggested compensation, if the executive 
has the ability to choose the level of volatility she would prefer an intermediate level of 
volatility that would maximize the value of her compensation.  
 The payoff at expiry of the new suggested executive compensation *TE can be 
written as: 
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       { } { }LTHPDT HVHMFFVCPDTT FFHFFVE >>+> ++−−−= 11)0,max(* β                        (6) 
 
The third term on the RHS of equation (6) is the payoff due to the suggested new 
component of executive compensation that can be priced as a pair of binary call options 
with different strikes. Therefore the option equivalent of the total value of the executive 
compensation can be written as 
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This can be written as: 
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The sensitivity of the new executive component to assets risk can be found in two 
steps: first, we calculate the sensitivity of the new component to assets risk and then we 
can set to zero (or to reduce to a negligible level) the sensitivity to assets risk of the value 
of the two other components of executive compensation by monitoring their quantities. 
This is possible due to their offsetting sensitivity to assets risk.  Therefore, only the 
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sensitivity of the new component of executive compensation to risk needs to be analyzed, 
and the sensitivity to assets volatility is derived as follows: 
 
 
           
σσ
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*
HPDHPDM
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∂
                 (9) 
.   
The value of the long call cash-or-nothing option with the low strike price, the first term 
on the RHS of equation (9), decreases with assets volatility, whereas the value of the 
short call cash-or-nothing option with the high strike increases with assets volatility. 
These two options which are both “out of the money” have opposing impacts on the 
value of the total executive compensation and therefore its value reaches the maximum at 
some intermediate level of risk. Executives would try to maximize their compensation by 
finding the volatility level that maximizes compensation such that: 
 
                                    0*
*
==∂
∂ σσσ
E  while  02
*2
<∂
∂
σ
E                                               (10) 
 
Equation (10) is solved numerically, in the absence of a closed form solution, to illustrate 
the impact of the executive’s “constrained” maximization on the choice of investment 
policy and thus on risk incentives. 
The main results are, first, if there is a fixed compensation FM with a payoff that is 
above the market value of the firm’s assets there will be an interior solution for the 
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optimal volatility. This is unlike the Black-Scholes- Merton equity pricing result, where 
as assets risk increases, the value of shareholders’ wealth increases as well.  Figure 5 
presents the value of the executive compensation versus leverage ratios for different 
levels of volatility. The new compensation scheme entitles the executive to receive a 
compensation which is 3.5 times greater than the fixed payoff if the value of the stock by 
the end of the year is between 0.15 and 0.45. This is equivalent to receiving the same 
payment if the value of the firm’s assets is between 1.25 and 1.45. It can be seen that at 
time 0, if the leverage ratio is relatively moderate, where the parameter γ  is between 1.06 
and 1.22, the executive can maximize the value of her compensation by choosing a 
moderate volatility level of 25%. Second, as the firm’s leverage decreases the optimal 
volatility level would decrease. Figure 6 presents the volatility level that maximizes the 
executive compensation for different leverage ratios. When 1.1=γ the optimal volatility 
level is 18% whereas when the leverage ratio decreases and γ  is set equal to 1.2 and 1.3 
respectively the optimal volatility is equal to 14% and 11% respectively.  
Third, as the lower threshold, LH (the value of assets have to be above it at 
maturity for executives to receive their fixed payment, MF ), increases, the optimal value 
of volatility increases as well. Finally, as the upper threshold, LH  (the value of assets 
have to be below it at maturity for executives to get MF ), increases, the optimal value of 
volatility is increases as well. Table 1 presents the optimal volatility value when  1.1=γ  
for different lower and upper levels of threshold ranges. When the fixed compensation is 
paid at maturity only if the value of assets at maturity is between 1.15 and 1.20 the 
optimal volatility level is equal to only 6.44%. However, when the “payoff window” is 
shifted to the levels between 1.30 and 1.35 the optimal volatility is equal to 14.07%. 
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Furthermore, when the payoff window at which the fixed compensation upon maturity is 
paid is widened and located between 1.30 and 1.60 the optimal volatility level is equal 
25.95%. In the extreme case, when a fixed compensation would be paid at maturity at any 
assets value which is above 1.3, the optimal volatility level is equal 57.80%.  The 
implication is that a policymaker (regulator), who wants to restrict the volatility of the 
financial institution’s assets, can set an upper and a lower level for the moneyness of the 
compensation and thus determine the range of asset volatility that the executives would 
choose.  
 
5. Summary 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis was caused by a number of factors, one of which was 
excessive risk taking by financial institutions. The increased motivation for risk taking 
can be explained by the rapid growth of equity based executive compensation in recent 
years. The paper first analyzes an executive compensation structure that is composed of a 
fixed cash payment which is paid unless the firm is insolvent and an equity based 
compensation in the form of executive stock options.  
We first show that under relatively low levels of leverage the total value of a 
compensation that is dominated by equity based compensation is maximized by choosing 
the highest possible level of assets risk and can therefore lead to excessive risk taking. 
The next step analyzes the same compensation structure but with a high levels of 
leverage (low assets values) where the fixed compensation is the dominant component. 
Under such circumstances the rational executives will choose the lowest possible level of 
assets risk since this maximizes the value of their compensation. In the past, stockholders 
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could restore the executive incentives for taking risk, in a manner that is aligned with 
their interests by increasing the size of the equity based compensation. However under 
the current regulations and trends in corporate governance they are more limited in doing 
so. Therefore, the existing executive compensation scheme leads to a concave 
relationship between assets risk and the value of the compensation and creates an 
incentive for the executive to choose corner solutions, that either lead to an excessive risk 
taking or to a freeze out of the lending activity to the public.  
 The major contribution here is a proposed new component for executive 
compensation that leads to an interior solution of risk taking. The component is paid only 
if the value of the firm’s assets is within a predetermined range of assets value at 
expiration. This new form of compensation creates a convex relationship between assets 
risk and the value of the compensation.  
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Table 1: The Optimal volatility in the presence of the new executive 
compensation 
This table presents the optimal volatility level in percentages that maximizes the value of 
the executive compensation for different values of LH and HH , the two thresholds 
denoting the range of firm’s value at maturity for the executive to receive a fixed 
compensation of MF . All the other data are the same as in Figure 1. We assume that the 
leverage ratio γ  is assumed to equal to 1.1.  
 
HH Values  
HL 
Values 1.20 1.25 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.50 1.55 1.60 
1.15       
6.44        8.21        9.81 
    
11.28  
    
12.64  
    
13.91  
    
15.09  
    
16.19      17.23 
1.20 
     10.65      12.43 
    
14.07  
    
15.59  
    
17.01  
    
18.33  
    
19.58      20.76 
1.25 
          -        12.43 
    
14.07  
    
18.02  
    
19.53  
    
20.95  
    
22.28      23.54 
1.30 
          -             -   
    
18.48  
    
20.17  
    
21.75  
    
23.24  
    
24.63      25.95 
1.35 
          -             -            -   
    
22.13  
    
23.77  
    
25.31  
    
26.76      28.13 
1.40 
          -             -            -            -   
    
25.64  
    
27.22  
    
28.71      30.12 
1.45 
          -             -            -            -            -   
    
29.00  
    
30.52      31.97 
1.50 
          -             -            -            -            -            -    
    
32.22      33.70 
1.55 
            35.32 
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Figure 1: Executive compensation versus leverage for different levels of 
assets risk and a high ratio between fixed and variable compensations 
This figure presents the total value of the executive compensation according to the option 
based method, where the ratio between the amount of fixed compensation and the 
notional amount of the option based compensation is equal to 2.5. The time horizon, T , 
is equal to 1, the risk free rate r  is 5%, and assets volatility is set at different values of 
5%, 15%, 25% and 35%. The leverage ratio, which is defined by )( PC FFV += γ , where 
V is/ the current value of the firm assets and `CF and `PF are the face value of the senior 
deposits and the subordinated debt or the preferred stocks respectively, has values 
between 0.7 and 1.75. The executive equity based compensation is in the form of a call 
option on the firm assets with a strike price which is equal to 35.1=γ  
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Figure 2: Executive compensation versus leverage for different levels of 
assets risk and a low ratio between fixed and variable compensation 
This figure presents the total value of the executive holding according to the option based 
method, where the ratio between the amount of fixed payment and the notional amount of 
the option based compensation is equal to 0.4. All the other data are the same as in Figure 
(1).  
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Figure 3: Executive compensation versus assets risk leverage for 
different leverage levels and a low ratio between fixed and variable 
compensation 
This figure presents the total value of the executive compensation according to the option 
based method, where the ratio between the amount of fixed compensation and the 
notional amount of the option based compensation is equal to 0.4. The leverage ratio, 
defined by )( PC FFV += γ , where V is the current value of the firm assets and `CF and 
`PF are the face value of the senior deposits and the subordinated debt or the preferred 
stocks respectively, takes on values of 1.3 1.2,  1.1, ,1=γ and 1.4. Assets volatility can 
vary between 1% and 70%.  
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Figure 4: Equity-based compensation, the fixed compensation and the 
total value of the executive compensation versus assets risk  
This figure presents the total value of the executive compensation, the equity based 
compensation and the fixed value compensation according to the option based method, 
where the ratio between the amount of fixed compensation and the notional amount of the 
option base compensation is equal to 0.4. The leverage ratio, defined 
by )( PC FFV += γ , equals to 1.1=γ and assets volatility varies between 1% and 50%. 
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Figure 5: New Executive compensation versus leverage for different 
levels of assets risk  
This figure presents the total value of the executive holding according to the new 
suggested compensation. The ratio between the amount of fixed compensation and the 
notional amount of the option base compensation is equal to 2.5. The time horizon, T , is 
equal to1 year, the risk free rate r  5%, assets volatility is given values of 5%, 15%, 25% 
and 35%. The executive receives an extra compensation that is three times greater than 
the fixed payment if at maturity the value of the stock price is between 0.15 and 0.35, 
which is equivalent to assets value between 1.25 and 1.45. The executive equity based 
compensation is in the form of a call option on the firm assets with a strike price equal to 
35.1=γ  
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Figure 6: New Executive compensation versus assets volatility for 
different levels of leverage.   
This figure presents the total value of the executive compensation according to the new 
suggested compensation. The leverage ratio, as measured by the ratio between assets and 
the face value of debt is equal 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3.  All the other data are the same as in 
Figure 5.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The accords of Basel I (1998), Basel II (2004) and Basel Market Risk (2005). 
2 Deviations from the assumption of a positive relationship between assets risk and the 
value of the executive compensation were made by Carpenter (2000), who assumed that 
the manager is risk averse and can not hedge his executive option and by Hall (1998), 
who argues that the affect of option grants on CEO risk-taking is a function of the CEO's 
risk aversion, which in turn depends on his wealth and other factors.  
3  The largest stimulus programs are the following: Term Auction Facility (TAF) (12/07) 
with Federal Reserve lending to commercial banks and MBS used as collateral $2.9 
trillion allocated, and spent $469 billion;  the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
(10/08) with U.S. Treasury injection of capital and bailouts, purchase of toxic assets, 
$700 billion allocated , and $323 billion spent; the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF) (11/08) with the  purchase of  assets backed consumer loans,$1 trillion 
allocated; the FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (11/08) of new bank issued 
bonds, with $1.5 trillion allocated and $297 billion spent as of February 2009. 
4As an example, on November 20 2008, Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), the chairman of 
the House Financial Services Committee, has mentioned that the Treasury’s rules could 
run counter to the efforts of corporate-governance activists, who have sought in recent 
years to link CEO pay to the company’s performance.  
5 See the Accountability for the Troubled Asset Relief Program: The Second Report of 
the Congressional Oversight Panel January 9, 2009. American Express, Bank of America, 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are among big institutions that reported a sharp rise 
in their holdings of cash and easy-to-sell securities in the first quarter of 2009.  
6 There is empirical evidence of the inhibiting effect of termination risk on managerial 
risk taking that offsets the positive effect of the convexity of managerial compensation. 
However termination risk is in general exogenous and cannot be use as a form of 
compensation (Chakraborty et al 2007). 
7 To keep the notation as simple as possible, all variables without subscripts are present 
values. 
 33
                                                                                                                                                 
8 The cash payoff includes salary, bonus and other benefits. However, recent empirical 
studies (Bebchuk and Jackson 2005, Sundaram and Yermack 2007, and Gerakos 2007) 
have found that U.S. CEOs hold substantial defined benefit pensions that yield an equal 
claim with other creditors in bankruptcy, and thus constitute inside debt. The affect of 
these claims on the risk-taking motivation of the managers can be offset or eliminate by 
the reputation effect of the bankrupt company as described by Hirshleifer and Thakor 
(1992). 
9 We assume that in the case of executive stock option the dilution effect is relatively 
small and has only a secondary effect on the other liabilities issued by the financial 
institution.  
10  U.S. depository institutions reduced net loans from 60.3% of total assets in 12/31/2006 
to 55.6% in 12/31/2008, in the same periods their cash holdings doubled from 4% to 8%. 
